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1. Introduction 
 
Ethnicity and ethnic strife continue to dominate the political economy, politics and 
society of many countries, especially those in the developing world.  From extreme 
manifestations of civil war and genocide, through the periodic “ethnic riots” that disfigure 
the social and political landscape, to the quotidian politics of ethnic allegiance, ethnicity 
has come to the forefront of the development discourse.  Not surprisingly, academic 
researchers in economics, sociology, anthropology and political science have over the last 
decade and half given special attention to this subfield and produced fresh theoretical and 
empirical insights that have enriched the debate in each of these disciplines.  
 
 The connection of conflict to ethnic identity rests on a number of conceptual and 
methodological issues.  A central issue is the force of ethnicity, whether it is a relatively 
robust marker of individual identity that exists as a more or less uniform force of more or 
less equal importance across a range of actual or potential social, economic and political 
situations, or whether its force strengthens when boundary issues – of maintenance and 
perpetuation under real or perceived threat – are encountered. This latter point generally 
asserts the idea that ethnicity is an effect of broader social, political and economic 
processes and the way in which these create particular types of group dynamic. There is 
also the question of the conditions under which identity is seen as shared and what 
conditions may lead to that shared identity to be perceived as under threat. 
  
 The focus of these questions is on the boundary maintenance of ethnic groups.  
Sociological and anthropological approaches to ethnicity have, particularly since the work 
of Frederick Barth (1969), begun with the assumption that ethnic groups exist in relation to 
other groups.  Ethnicity, its existence or degree of force, is not realized in the possession 
and perpetuation of distinct cultural characteristics by a particular group.  Ethnic identity 
and difference is created and becomes culturally and politically meaningful in terms of how 
it inter-relates to other groups and to broader social, political and economic processes.  
Ethnic boundaries, for both sociology and anthropology, tend to be the outcome of social 
action (Malesevic, 2004).  
 
 The objective of this paper is to present an overview of ethnicity, ethnic strife and 
its consequences, as seen from the perspective of the disciplines of economics, political 
science, social anthropology and sociology. What exactly is ethnicity--how is it to be 
defined, characterized and measured? What exactly are the causal links from ethnicity so 
defined to its presumed consequences, including tension and violence? What are the 
feedback loops from the consequences of ethnic divisions back to these divisions 
themselves? How can policy, if at all, mitigate ethnic divisions and ethnic conflict? Finally, 
what role does interdisciplinarity have in helping to understand ethnicity and ethnic strife, 
and how can interdisciplinary collaboration be enhanced? These are the questions which 
this paper takes up and deals with in sequence. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 begins the analysis by discussing how 
different disciplines approach the characterization and measurement of ethnicity. Section 3 
moves to the causal chain from ethnic diversity through ethnic tension to consequences 
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such as violence.  Section 4 follows the causal chain in the other direction, tracing feedback 
loops from ethnic conflict to the strengthening of ethnic identity itself. Section 5 addresses 
the question of what, if anything, public policy can do to address the problem of ethnic 
division and ethnic tension. Throughout this paper, we draw on the insights and approaches 
of economics, political science, social anthropology and sociology, noting the similarities, 
differences and complementarities of the different perspectives. Section 6 draws together 
the benefits of interdisciplinarity, and considers how it could best be advanced. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Ethnicity: Characterization and Measurement 
 
 Individuals have many observable characteristics—height, weight, race, language, 
religion, nationality, residential location, occupation, income, wealth, education, 
membership of a club, and so on. Individuals with the same characteristics, or set of 
characteristics, can be thought of in purely descriptive terms as a grouping. Under certain 
conditions, certain groupings could potentially have social, political and economic salience. 
Our focus is on groups formed out of commonalities of race, language, religion, or 
combinations thereof, at different locations. Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad are two 
such groups, as are the Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria. We refer to such groups as “ethnic 
groups.” 
 
 There is plenty of evidence of close networks within ethnic groups, which take on 
social and economic dimensions.1
The classic text by Horowitz (1985) makes the case that the conventional 
interpretation of ethnicity as connected only to language or race is much too narrow.  
Horowitz argues that ascription – connection to birth – is the primary, if not the only, 
criterion.   Seen this way, religion, caste, tribe, race and language are simply different 
forms of ethnicity, which is viewed by Horowitz, and many others, as an umbrella term.   
Though in some societies, religion is a matter of choice, in most societies religious identity 
is given at birth.   Similarly, people can in principle move from one linguistic community 
 The presence of different ethnic groups may be 
associated with ethnic tension, and a failure of collective action detrimental to the 
wellbeing of both groups and of society at large. But not necessarily. Our task is to 
examine the conditions under which ethnic grouping translates into ethnic tension, and 
thence into failure of collective action and possibly violence. Apart from the analytical and 
intellectual challenge this poses, such an examination is important because it could help in 
the design of public policy to contain and manage ethnic tension. 
 
In order to begin the analysis of ethnicity and ethnic strife, we need definition, 
characterization and measurement of ethnicity. How do various disciplines, or scholars, 
understand the concept of ethnicity?  How do they measure it?  Indeed, some might ask: 
can it be measured at all? Two different types of issues are involved here.  The first has to 
do with whether ethnicity should be defined broadly or narrowly.  The second is how 
malleable ethnic identity is, and what malleability might do to its measurement.   
 
                                                 
1 See Fafchamps (2000, 2004), Biggs, Raturi and Srivastava, (2002), and La Ferrara (2003a). 
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to another, but in most societies, the first language – or “mother tongue” – lasts through a 
lifetime.  Race, tribe and caste are generally understood to be quite inflexible.  
Anthropologists have argued that this inflexibility stems from the repetition of custom and 
ritual, often backed by the state, that creates an ideology of their inflexibility and salience 
(Mafeje, 1971; Mamdani, 1996; Dirks, 2001).   Horowitz (1985) and others argue that class 
is different from ethnicity because movements across class boundaries are relatively more 
common.   In contrast, the sociologist Stephen Steinberg argues that those traits commonly 
recognized as ethnic may be class-based: he argues that many cultural attributes attributed 
to ethnicity may be rooted in class difference (Steinberg, 2001). 
 
But how much does birth determine?  Are ethnic categories also to some extent a 
matter of choice?  Here two types of debates have been central.  The first was between 
essentialists and instrumentalists in the 1960s and 1970s.  The second debate was launched 
by constructivists in the 1980s and 1990s.2
By now, constructivist views of ethnic identity have captured the intellectual 
mainstream.
   
 
3
 The idea that ethnicity is a result of classification leads scholars to the study of 
practices of classification, particularly those employed by the state.  This Foucaultian 
method has not however always been sensitive to the idea that techniques of rule imposed 
by the state do not simply overwhelm individuals and groups.  Rather, individuals and 
groups receive, respond and sometimes re-work state power (Li, 1999).  Ethnic 
categorizations formulated at the national scale may play out differently at local scales.  
Other cultural, political and economic dimensions come into play when people encounter 
  Several identity categories are given to each of us at the time our birth: only 
some are relevant at different points in life.  What our identity at any given point is, how its 
intensity changes, or how it gives way to another identity altogether – these are determined, 
or “constructed” -- by institutions, historical epochs, economic endowments, demography 
and politics (Laitin 1998).  In other words, identities are indeed malleable, but not infinitely 
so, calling upon us to analyze in detail the interplay between different forces that shape 
group identity (Taylor 1994). 
 
Ethnicity is thus at least partly produced by techniques of classification and 
categorization.  The sense of shared traits and communal identity which allows the passage 
from individual identity to group identity and back again is a second order phenomenon.  
That is, it is the result of broader organizing techniques that employ tools such as census 
categories to organize populations (Barth, 1969; Hirschman, 1987; Anderson, 1991).  A 
related concern is the interplay of individual identification and external classification, 
focusing on institutional and organizational, pedagogical and disciplinary, techniques that 
structure and orient individual forms of self-classification allowing their aggregation into 
broader group classifications (Brubaker et al, 2004).  The focus then is on the processes of 
categorization and on the meaning and consequences that this has for political, social and 
economic governance (Williams, 1989). 
 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion, see Varshney (2007).  
3 But the contructivist views of ethnic conflict, as opposed to ethnic identity, remain less compelling.  See 
Varshney (1997 and 2007).   
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the disciplinary and pedagogical power of state institutions.  Classificatory practices 
designed to impart conceptions of ethnicity are not then simply received at the local scale 
but are reworked in relation to local political, economic and social dimensions.  A focus on 
the way that state classificatory practices are received, and responded to, at the local scale 
shifts somewhat the analysis away from a focus on governmental practices to local 
mechanisms.  The telling issue becomes the analysis of when and why people interpret 
social issues in ethnic terms.  The focus in sociology and social anthropology on the way in 
which ethnic identity is formed through boundary maintenance in relation to other groups 
and processes leads to a series of questions about the relation of bestowed population 
categories to socio-political dynamics at the local level.  The focus here is on how ethnicity 
arises as an effect or consequence of broader dynamics.  Important as this approach is to 
contextualizing ethnicity and the consequences of ethnic division to a broader spectrum of 
social processes, a concern is that the approach fails to take into account how ethnicity may 
serve a cognitive purpose as a means of interpreting, framing and understanding experience 
(Brubaker et al, 2004).   
 
In sum, the attempt in sociological and social anthropological approaches to render 
ethnicity relational and dynamic, to understand it as a social process, is important in 
locating ethnic identity in the broader contexts of its historical and social development.  A 
tendency, though, may be to overly emphasize group dynamics and group ontologies to the 
extent that the ways in which individuals relate to ethnicity – or other markers of identity – 
as a means of responding to different processes is sometimes marginalized.  This is not to 
privilege an autonomous individual in a social vacuum.  Brubaker, et al (2004) focus not on 
the individual as self-sufficient source of his or her identity, but on how identity and 
cognition arise socially, through the “socially shared understanding of social objects” 
(Brubaker, et al, 2004: 52). 
 
Taking a particular definition of ethnic boundaries, how do we characterize and 
measure ethnic diversity? The issues that arise in formulating a theoretically satisfying 
measure can be illustrated with the important case of the index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) index, which has been deployed to measure ethnic diversity. In 
Easterly and Levine (1997), which can be said to have ignited much of the recent 
economics oriented quantitative literature, the index is simply the probability that two 
randomly drawn individuals from the country (say) belong to two different groups. This 
can be written as: 
 
ELF = 1 – Σi si2 
 
where si is the share of group i in the total population. This index was applied to a forty 
year old compendium of the world’s language groups constructed by Soviet linguists and 
anthropologists, the Atlas Narodov Mira. Easterly and Levine (1997) then sought to 
discover whether this index was correlated with outcomes such as economic growth.  On 
the whole, they found a negative and statistically significance correlation. The basic 
strategy was applied by much of the subsequent economics literature (see Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005, for a survey).   
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 Critiques by economists of the ELF approach have focused on issues like missing 
data for certain countries, or whether the particular index is appropriate.4
Third, constructivist accounts of identity formation make it abundantly clear that 
while identities do not normally change in the short-run, alterations are quite possible in the 
medium to long run.  Two types of changes have often been noted.  The relative salience of 
the different dimensions of identity is often transformed in response to serious changes in 
political institutions, laws or economic conditions.  In India, language was a significant 
basis of ethnic politics in the 1950s.  After each major linguistic group was given a state of 
its own in the Indian federation, language ceased to be a salient and divisive issue in Indian 
politics.  One can also show that in many cases, group identities -- not simply the salience 
of different dimensions of a group’s identity – are fundamentally transformed as a result of 
a public policy, state behavior or transformative “exogenous” shocks.   Via public schools 
and conscription armies, peasants were turned into Frenchmen over several decades after 
the French Revolution (Weber 1976).
 For example, ELF 
as defined above implies that fractionalization is greater when there are 100 equally sized 
groups than when there are two equally sized groups. If fractionalization is taken as 
tantamount to tension, then these features should give us pause, and alternative ways of 
combing group population shares, to measure “polarization” have been suggested in the 
economics literature (for example, see Esteban and Ray, 1994, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu, 
2003; and  Montalvo and Reyna-Querol, 2005). But all of these have taken as given the 
basic classification to which the index is applied. 
 
In political science, a powerful critique of the ELF approach has emerged, 
influenced in part by constructivist insights (Chandra 2006; Posner, 2004a and 2004b).   
Three critiques, which focus not so much on the index but on the underlying classification, 
challenged the relevance of the ELF index for measuring ethnic diversity or 
fractionalization.  First, the most significant ethnic identities in a society are not always 
based on language.   Tribe, race, caste or religion could be the more important basis for 
ethnic identification.  In India, on the whole, religion has been a stronger determinant of 
group identity than language.  In Nigeria’s Yorubaland, tribe has been more salient than 
religion or language (Laitin, 1986). 
 
Second, the ELF index not only does not capture different dimensions of identity 
(let us say, linguistic and religious); it also does not say anything about whether the 
dimensions cumulate or intersect.  In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and Tamils are not only 
divided by language, but also greatly, if not entirely, by religion.  In Indonesia, the Chinese 
and pribumi (“sons of the soil”) are divided by religion and race, but not language.  
Muslims and Hindus in many parts of India are divided by religion but united by language.  
The Sri Lankan case is one of cumulative differences, the Indonesian and Indian of 
crosscutting differences.  Cross-cutting differences might on the whole be more 
manageable than the cumulative ones.   
 
5
                                                 
4 The literature is by now huge. See for example, Arcand, Guillaumont and Guillaumont (2000), Bates 
(2000), or Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
5 Also see Colley (1993) for the construction of British national identity.   
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In short, a linguistically based conceptual division made in the 1950s, even if right 
for that period, is not necessarily a good predictor of identities in the 1980s and 1990s.    
That is too long a stretch to assume stability of identities.   The stability is to be 
demonstrated, not assumed.   The negative correlation discovered between the ELF index 
and economic growth rates may, thus, be difficult to interpret.   
  
Have the constructivist insights only led to criticisms?   Is constructivism as a 
theoretical device amenable only to qualitative empirical research a la Benedict Anderson 
(1991) and critique, or can its theoretical potential be also meaningfully deployed in 
quantitative measurement?  A creative shadow of this question looms over some new 
attempts to marry positivism and constructivism.  Especially in relation to assessing its 
impact on conflict, some new ways of measuring ethnic diversity, consistent with 
constructivist critiques, are currently under way (Cedereman, Wimmer and Min, 2009). 
 
 
3. Ethnic Diversity and its Consequences 
 
 The daily life of families, neighborhoods, regions and countries is influenced by 
ethnic divisions. At the national level, politics in many, if not all, parts of the world, is 
often structured along ethnic lines, with major political parties representing different ethnic 
groupings.  We have already pointed to the finding that there might be a negative 
association between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and economic growth. At the local 
level, too, it is quite possible for politics to be influenced by ethnic divisions. It has been 
shown that local supply of public goods is adversely affected when the population is 
ethnically heterogeneous (Alesina, Baqr and Easterly, 1999; Gugerty and Miguel, 2005). 
 
 Group violence, riots and civil war are the most extreme manifestation of the 
consequences of ethnic divisions. A large literature shows the positive association between 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization and the probability of civil war (Collier et al, 2003). There 
is also a substantial literature on ethnic riots (Brass 1997; Varshney, 2002 and 2008;  
Wilkinson, 2005; van Klinken, 2007; Davidson, 2008; Berenschott, 2009). But a key point 
to note is that very often, even perhaps as a rule, ethnic divisions do not lead to violent 
consequences (Fearon and Laitin 1996). 6
 A central point in drawing a causal link from ethnic diversity to outcomes such as 
violence is that we must be careful not to attribute more to diversity than is warranted. This 
over-attribution can happen for several reasons. First, if there are feedback effects from 
outcomes to ethnicity and ethnic diversity (for example as violence sharpens ethnic 
   A comparative perspective is thus needed to 
understand what differentiates those cases with violent outbreaks and those cases where 
violence does not break out. An important hypothesis is that a thick weave of associational 
life that knits together ethnic groups is what prevents the outbreak of violence and riots 
(Varshney, 2002). At the same time, politicians, local and national, who use ethnic 
divisions to mobilize support can cause divisions to sharpen and make them more prone to 
violence. 
 
                                                 
6 For the highly influential early insights on these matters, see Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) and Weiner 
(1978). 
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identification, or changes the character of neighborhoods through migration) then 
“simultaneity bias” can lead to a ascribing a bigger impact of diversity than appropriate. 
Second, if ethnicity and ethnic diversity are, in and of themselves,  the product of factors 
other than the consequences--for example if it is the result of a long history of colonial 
attempts to classify the population, the better to control it—then in a fundamental sense 
ethnic diversity is only the proximate cause of violence. The ultimate cause is the colonial 
project, and beginning with the ethnic diversity measure may divert from a deeper analysis. 
Third, if ethnic tensions and violence are caused by some third factor—the lead example 
being social mobilization by political entrepreneurs who simultaneously raise ethnic 
awareness and mistrust while at the same time fomenting interethnic violence—then 
attributing causality to ethnic diversity is misplaced and misleading. The different 
disciplines are of course aware of these issues, but they are perhaps given different weights, 
and are addressed differently. 
 
 The economics literature, in particular the dominant part of it which uses cross-
country econometric analysis to investigate the link between ethnic diversity and 
consequence such as economic growth, uses well known econometric techniques to address 
the above issues. A thorough account is provided in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Thus, 
for example, in regressions explaining cross-country variations in economic growth, they 
use not only the ELF measure (and variants thereof) as an explanatory variable, but also 
other “standard” economic variables such as schooling, financial depth, regional dummy 
variables to separate out regional effects, period dummy variables to account for possible 
historical effects, and variable such as “assassinations” to measure the general political 
climate. They also use “seemingly unrelated regressions” methods to address common but 
unobserved factors that might affect the estimated influence of the fractionalization 
variable.  
 
 The literature on this is by now veritably large, and many other variants and 
corrections have been tried. The bottom line consensus seems to be that fractionalization 
affects growth negatively.  But there are further twists to this story that the economics 
literature considers. Thus, for example, Collier (2000) shows that the negative effects on 
growth are present only in non-democracies. One issue is that since democracies are 
generally richer, is this just capturing a tendency for richer societies cope with diversity 
better? This high correlation between income and democracy makes specific attribution to 
each difficult, and of course the mutual causality between these two is another 
complication.7 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) draw two conclusions form their regressions: 
“Overall, the effect of income seems more robust and more precisely estimated than the 
effect of democracy”, and “rich democracies are more capable of ‘handling’ productively 
ethnic diversity”, but they also add the caveat that “It may be the case that racially 
fragmented societies that choose democratic institutions are also those in which ethnic 
cleavages are less deep and/or the power distribution of groups is such that none can 
impose on-democratic rule.”8
                                                 
7 See for example, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) 
8 On the general question of institutions and conflict within a cross-country regression framework, see 
Easterly (2001). 
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It is in these caveats of the careful econometric work that we begin to see the 
complementary strengths of other disciplines that focus more directly on the causal 
mechanisms, and study individual cases in great detail. In political science, for example, 
particular attention is paid to the nature of the state. The relationship between ethnic 
diversity and violent conflict -- riots, pogroms, genocides, civil wars -- has been a 
significant research theme in political science for years.   The central claim is not that in 
and of itself, as indicated above, ethnic diversity promotes violent conflict.  Rather, it is 
normally argued that the link between ethnic diversity and violence is mediated by the 
state, political and civil institutions.    
 
In modern times, the state is, in principle, a neutral institution, to which is assigned 
the task of maintaining peace and order.  The state, however, does not often do what it is 
supposed to do, favoring instead one ethnic community, especially the majority 
community, over the others.  Such majoritarianism often breeds violence.  
 
There are several ways in which the state can provide security and protection to the 
minorities.  Political science has debated the institutional alternatives for quite a long time.  
Arend Lijphart was the first to respond concretely to an insight, originally ascribed to John 
Stuart Mill (1990), that political institutions appropriate for homogenous nations were not 
easily transferable to multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies.  A first-past-the-post and 
winner-take-all polity may permanently aggrieve minorities, generating rebellions and 
secessions.  On the basis of the historical experience of four smaller European democracies 
-- the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria - Lijphart (1977) argued that 
consociational democracies, not Westminster-style majoritarian democracies, were the 
foundation of social peace and political stability in societies with substantial ethnoreligious 
tensions.  Winners do not take all in consociational systems.  The polity is based on 
proportional representation, not first past the post; minorities are given a pre-assigned share 
of political power; a minority veto is guaranteed on key cultural matters, including schools, 
language policy and religious practice. 
 
  A great deal of literature critical of the universal ambition of the consociational 
theory has emerged over the last three decades.  The key criticism is that the success of 
consociational democracy is based on some specific conditions that the four smaller 
European democracies shared.  Consociationalism cannot be successfully transferred to all 
multiethnic societies.  Horowitz (1989) suggests that making acquisition of power 
dependent some proportion of minority vote, in addition to a majority or plurality vote 
overall, may be a better way to integrate minorities.  Assigning them specific shares in 
positions of power would only freeze minority and majority identities forever, a situation 
not always conducive for peace.  Horowitz called his proposal “vote pooling”.     
    
Other analyses suggest that the mediating institutions do not have to be strictly part 
of the state.  In multi-party systems, political parties, including those in the opposition, can 
be inclusive, if they build cross-ethic coalitions.  Similarly, it has been argued that 
integrated business associations, professional associations and trade unions can promote 
peace at the local level, even when the larger national atmosphere is not conducive to peace 
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(Varshney 2002).  The institutional thinking in political science goes all the way down to 
the local institutions that can contain tensions and preempt, or reduce, ethnic violence. 
 
The anthropological and sociological literature also takes the state as a key entity 
that interacts with, and even creates, ethnic divisions and ethnic tension.  If boundaries of 
ethnic groups are a result of the way that state classificatory strategies interact with local 
structures, and shared local cognitive mechanisms and local institutions, then a study of the 
connection between ethnic boundaries and strife must involve also the analysis of local 
dimensions.  One important consequence is that macro explanations of ethnic conflict do 
not always travel well.  The causal connection between ethnic identity and ethnic strife 
should involve some study of the constitutive meanings of ethnicity at particular spaces.  
What are the economic, political and social dimensions that come into play in the 
establishment of ethnic identity as a particularly useful or powerful category?  Such 
dimensions, be they political, economic, cultural or cognitive, are themselves multiply 
constituted across different scales.  Religious feeling at a particular local site may be 
influenced by transnational forces and the institutions that mediate and orient these.  The 
focus on the multiple constitution of identity should not stall analysis or fetishise the local.  
It should lead to the analysis of a broad spectrum of local, global and regional institutions 
and processes. The ‘local’ is influenced and produced by the play of economic, cultural and 
political forces that connect the local to a variety of scales. 
 
 The focus on ethnicity as a cognitive frame for interpreting and understanding 
broader phenomena involves a study of the ways in which ethnic feeling is framed and 
transmitted in social spaces.  Treating ethnicity as a cognitive frame – a means by which 
social phenomena are interpreted and understood in ethnic terms - involves thinking 
through how shared ideas about ethnicity in social space are constituted not simply at the 
individual or local level.  Rather, ideas and frames of understanding that are the basis from 
which ethnic cognition arises are constituted across different scales. 
 
 The way in which violence or the provision of public goods, to take two very 
different examples, relates to ethnic identity may be analysed by looking at how both are 
affected by broader forces.  State provided public goods such as education are often not 
neutral, but may be part of strategies of establishing the authority of a state over a 
population.  Alternative means of education, including the provision of private or 
community religious or ethnic schools funded by transnational networks may arise as a 
means of countering that assertion of state authority.  Such transnational networks 
themselves provide fodder for cognitive frames.  The state is not necessarily the primary 
actor in the regulation and management of ethnic identity and ethnic division.  Counter-
authorities exist, and the provision of alternative public goods is a way both of addressing 
the state’s authority to manage and govern groups and to assert an alternative structure of 
authority over groups. 
 
 To summarize, while all disciplines have tried to understand the causal link between 
ethnic diversity, ethnic tension and consequences such as violence, supply of public goods 
and economic performance, economist have tended to take a more aggregative, cross-
country view, attempting to explain broad variations in outcomes such as economic growth 
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through broad variations in ethnic fragmentation, while attempting to control for other 
factors, using data on a large number of countries. The central finding, that fragmentation 
weakens economic performance, has provided the basis for an extensive debate. Political 
scientists have also used “large n” methodologies but have focused much more on detailing 
the causal mechanisms, in particular the precise role of the state or political institutions in 
translating, or mitigating the link from diversity through tension to violence. Social 
anthropologists have been the strongest proponents of the argument that the link from 
diversity to violence or other outcomes is highly contingent on myriad factors, many of 
which can only be understood in the local and specific context, including how the state has 
used ethnicity as a classificatory device for control, but also how populations have then 
reacted, and how state institutions interact with group and individual identity at the 
localized level. 
 
 
4. Feedback Loops: Conflict and Construction of Ethnicity 
 
 If ethnic division causes conflict, conflict sharpens ethnic division. More generally, 
a clean one way causal chain from ethnicity to a range of consequences cannot be easily 
established, because these consequences in turn determine the nature of ethnicity and ethnic 
divisions. This two way relationship raises questions about econometric regressions where 
ethnic division is used as an independent variable, to explain outcomes such as public 
goods provision or economic growth. By and large the econometrics literature does not 
explore the feedback loop in the other direction, taking ethnicity as a given, a phenomenon 
that changes only slowly relative to the processes of economic growth. There is, however, 
an emerging theoretical literature, linked to an earlier literature on club formation, which 
speaks to ethnic groupings being endogenous.9
 Civil wars are, of course, extreme cases of violence.  A great deal of constructivist 
literature also empirically demonstrates that even in normal times, identities can emerge in 
response to public policy.  The arguments about how census categories in colonial times 
sharpened, if not created, ethnic identities are now very commonly accepted.  The same 
arguments are also used for some colonial policies.  Laitin (1986) shows British colonial 
 
 
 Political scientists have been more critical of the exogeneity assumption, for 
example of the use of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization data as discussed in section 2.  
On how violent conflict shapes identities, while in turn being shaped by ethnic diversities, 
the literature is now voluminous.  Partition of India sharpened divisions between Hindus 
and Muslims, tearing apart in some cases even villages and towns where Hindus and 
Muslims were intermingling.  Bosnian civil war also appears to have made Muslim 
identities stronger in Bosnia than they used to be.   Civil wars often have this result because 
they undermine hybridity and impose polarization on societies by pushing people into 
identity camps.  For the sake of safety, people join ethnic groups even if their own prior 
identities were not sharply ethnic.   Arguments of this kind create serious issues for 
analyses that rely heavily on ethnic diversity as a cause of various outcomes, especially 
violence.  Mutual causation appears to be at work.   
  
                                                 
9 See for example, Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby, 2004, Demange and Wooders, 2005,  
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rulers legitimated religious categories in politics in Northern Nigeria, but delegitimized 
such categories in the Yoruba South, privileging instead tribal categories.  Such colonial 
practices, institutionalized for decades, had long-lasting consequences, even after 
independence.       
 
 However, it is anthropologists who have in the main emphasized strongly the 
perspective of ethnicity as determined by, as much as determining, the structures and 
phenomena surrounding it. As Paul Richards notes, “They favor instead a situationalist 
account. Ethnicity is a product of certain kind of group dynamics…The notion of 
situational ethnicity amounts to a claim that ethnicity is an epiphenomenon. It is a 
symptom, not cause, of certain forms of social mobilization.” (Richards, this Symposium).  
Further, if this social mobilization leads to violence it further strengthens group divisions. 
In this view, therefore, violence causes ethnic divisions as much as ethnic divisions causing 
violence. Although couched in a different language, these concerns are not far removed 
from econometricians concerns on attributing causality to correlation between measures of 
ethnic division and outcomes such as violence. “Unobserved heterogeneity” can produce a 
spurious correlation between the two variables, with some underlying factor (“social 
mobilization”) causing both the division and the violence. Or, indeed, the violence can 
have feedback effects on division, leading to an overestimate of the importance of division 
in causing violence (“simultaneity bias”). In other areas of econometric evaluation, for 
example, the impact of a public program on social outcomes, unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity bias are taken on board routinely. Not nearly so much with ethnic division and 
corresponding outcomes, which perhaps reveals the extent to which ethnicity as being 
“primordial” dominates the economic discourse. 
 
  Thus conflict that centres on the maintenance or perpetuation of group boundaries, and the 
competing imaginations of these, may feed back onto and strengthen group identity.  Conflict may 
arise from contrasting conceptions of the nature of group boundaries.  Competing structures of 
authority, including the state, local networks of patronage and transnational ideological, cultural or 
religious forces, may have very different conceptions of group boundaries and of threats to those 
boundaries.  Hence conflicts that may ostensibly be about issues of class or inequality may 
enter into established structures of meaning-making to give them an ethnic tinge.10
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
10 For example, in her studies of Adivasi groups in Kerala, Luisa Steur argues that loss of land, often due to 
transnational economic issues, is used by a transnational, and multinational, network of adivasi and 
indigenous peoples groups to mobilise ethnic identity (Steur, 2009).  Here adivasi identity is at least partly 
taken out of its local contexts and related to a broader international movement of indigenous groups.  While 
conflict does appear to contribute to the construction, and indeed regularization, of ethnic identity, it may be 
important to see how that conflict is read by different and competing structures of authority.  The conflict 
over land documented by Steur was interpreted by the local government in Kerala as an incidence of tribal 
recalcitrance in the face of modernity.  The Kerala government’s response (a mixture of punitive measures 
and the provision of economic goods) may be read as a means of asserting a particular discourse about 
‘tribals’ and it may reflect the tendency and preference of the government to localize the issue and problem of 
Adivasi whereas transnational networks of Adivasi and indigenous activists sought to locate the issue in terms 
of a broader incipient worldwide network of indigenous peoples. 
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5. Public Policy and Ethnic Tensions 
 
 If ethnic divisions often lead to bad outcomes, violence, riots, civil war, low supply 
of public goods and low economic growth, what can public policy do about it? 
 
The first principle is surely one of “do no harm”, since there is evidence that public 
policy has sometimes exacerbated ethnic divisions.  This is certainly the case when 
administrators of empires introduced divisions where none existed before, to better manage 
the large and diverse populations under their control.  But policy has caused divisions even 
when it has not intended to do so.  Quite benignly, when ethnicity is used to target transfers 
to poor populations; it can serve to exaggerate ethnic divisions on the ground. And there 
can be unintended consequences for ethnic division even of policies that ostensibly have 
nothing to do with ethnicity.  This is particularly the case with macroeconomic policy like 
trade liberalization, which favors broad economic sectors over others.  When these sectors 
align with ethnic groupings, ethnic divisions can sharpen in unintended fashion (Rwanda, 
Sri Lanka, Ghana).  Macroeconomic policy proposals should at the very least be aware of 
these unintended consequences. 
 
 More positively, how can policy help reduce ethnic divisions, or at least their 
negative consequences? I f cross-ethnic associational life is shown to be a mitigating factor 
in the causation of ethnic violence and riots, then support for such associational life might 
be suggested.  Certainly the economic analysis of free riding in collective action suggests 
that associational life will be underprovided.  A policy recommendation for a public 
subsidy to organizations promoting cross-ethnic links thus follows.  Such conclusions can 
be drawn, for example, from the economic analysis of La Ferrara (2003b), Dasgupta and 
Kanbur (2005, 2007) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005), and political science based analysis 
of Varshney (2002). 
 
  If average income gaps between ethnic groups stoke ethnic divisions, then a policy 
to reduce ethnic income gaps seems to suggest itself.  It can be argued that Malaysian 
policy after the race riots of 1969 embodied this strategy, and that it has on the whole 
worked well thus far, though some cracks may have opened up of late, as some Malaysians 
begin to argue that the policy has gone on for too long. Yet a policy for explicit support of 
Muslim groups in India, to overcome the large income gap between them and Hindus, may 
not work at all.  It is widely believed that such a policy will only stir a counter reaction 
among many parts of the Hindu community.  A policy to reduce income gaps, designed to 
mitigate ethnic tensions, may in fact exacerbate them in certain contexts. 
 
 Political scientists have vigorously debated policy intervention in the field of ethnic 
conflict.  The scholarly dispute is less over whether affirmative action is desirable, if some 
communities – often minorities (USA, India), but sometimes also majorities (Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, South Africa) -- feel a deep sense of historical injury, grievance, discrimination or 
injustice.  The contention is more typically over what form affirmative action should take: 
Should it be quota-based or incentives-based?  Should jobs and educational facilities be the 
basis of affirmative action, or political representation?  Should the public sector be 
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involved in responding to ethnic grievances, or also the private sector?  Should primary 
education of some groups be subsidized or also higher education?    
     
More ambitiously, going beyond specific policies, structural techniques have been 
proposed and analyzed.11
Scholars used to have consensus on the desirability of federalism, if ethnic groups 
were geographically concentrated.  India’s linguistic reorganization of polity in the 1950s 
and 1960s was widely viewed as a great institutional success.  By giving each major 
language group a state in India federation, Indian decision makers removed a great source 
of ethnic grievance from politics.  Religious, caste and tribal disputes continued to rage in 
India, but linguistic disputes progressively disappeared.  It was also often suggested that Sri 
Lanka’s inability to introduce federalism made the Sinhala-Tamil conflict truly explosive.
   Structural techniques do not emphasize specific policy 
initiatives.  Rather, the entire institutional design, aimed at restructuring how political 
power is organized and acquired, is the focus of structural methods. On structural 
techniques, a big debate in political science has already been summarized in the previous 
section: the debate on whether multiethnic societies need consociational systems for social 
peace?  Federalism as a structural technique has also attracted a great deal of attention.    
 
12
 One approach may be the emphasis on the disjuncture or gap between policy 
formulation and its implementation.  The focus outlined above is on an anthropology that 
looks at how policies -- of ethnic management for example -- play out in local settings.  
The idea is that policies formulated at the broad national level are implemented at the 
complex local level by agents and intermediaries of the state.  These agents and 
intermediaries relay state power to a local population.  In this transmission ideas 
formulated at the broad level may play out differently, they may be subject to corruption 
and they may be subject to contrasting responses and resistance at the local level.  It is 
  
    
 The break-up of Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, mostly along what 
were previously federal lines, has reignited the debate on whether federalism is a desirable 
institutional device at all, even when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated.  
Federal systems tend to give states a great deal of power.  Instead of arresting rebellion and 
secession, some scholars suggest, this might actually make both more likely.  A lively 
debate currently marks the analysis of the conditions under which federalism works, and 
the circumstances under which it does not (Roeder and Rothchild, 2006).  In short, the 
post-1945 experience of policy and institutional interventions continues to suggest that one 
size will not fit all.  Institutional and policy nuancing according to specific contexts may be 
necessary for successful intervention.   
 
 In the same spirit, while anthropology remains somewhat at the periphery of policy 
prescription, one of its important functions is as a corrective to policy that may have a 
tendency to flatten national space.  It reminds of the importance of local context, and the 
complexity and multi-scalar sense of the local.  However, it would be useful to try to think 
how this focus may be translated into concrete policy outcomes.   
 
                                                 
11 The conceptual difference between structural and policy techniques was first drawn by Horowitz (1985).  
12 Stepan, Linz and Yadav (forthcoming) make this point at great length. 
 15 
important, and this is perhaps what anthropology most fundamentally brings, to think about 
policy holistically: formulation is to be connected with implementation.  Anthropology 
may usefully provide insights into how policy may travel successfully to different sites. 
 
 In a different way, anthropology may contribute to public policy by reframing how 
policy issues are perceived.  The general tendency in anthropology, and sociology, to focus 
on the complex social lives of particular communities may act as a corrective to state-
centred framing of such communities.  The tendency in public policy debates to relate 
issues to broader national goals may obscure the actuality and meaning of issues in 
individual communities.  The contribution by anthropologists here has been to move away 
from this “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002) by 
demonstrating how issues thought in relation to the state and its particular goals of security 
and order may obscure the complexity of a given issue.13
6. Advancing Interdisciplinarity 
   
 
 Thus, anthropological perspectives warn us against a “one size fits all” application 
of policy, alerting us to the fact that funds may be ineffective, or may be misused and may 
end up being channeled to the exact opposite cause.  The local context may trump a general 
policy based on lessons from analysis at a highly aggregated or a highly abstract level. 
 
 
 
 We have seen that different disciplines bring different perspectives to the analysis 
and understanding of ethnicity and ethnic strife.14
 Equally surprisingly, perhaps, it is anthropologists who emphasize the difficulties of 
establishing clean simple causal claims, and precisely because of these issues.  The 
language may be different, but the cautionary notes are the same.  Within anthropology 
itself there is debate between the approach of a “thick description” case study which 
provides a lot of detail and context but which cannot be easily generalized, and “thin 
description” case studies which do not have as much context and detail, but sufficient to 
  Economists are perhaps the most 
abstract and most aggregated in their analysis.  They use a common model to understand 
the phenomenon at all levels, from local to national to international, but test the model 
primarily with data at the national level.  They tend to take ethnicity as exogenously given, 
not itself influenced by context or by feedback from its own consequences.  This is 
somewhat surprising given the attention given in the rest of economics to the difficulties of 
ascribing causality because of “unobserved heterogeneity” and “simultaneity bias.”  
 
                                                 
13  For example, the anthropologist Ana Bleahu, working with Romanian and Roma undocumented migrants 
in Italy, note that state discourses that emphasize the illegality of such groups that have legitimized policies of 
expulsion policy by the Italian authorities on people identified as Roma, presume a somewhat flat national 
space and the prevailing authority of the Romanian state over that space.  Bleahu argues that the policy of 
expulsion of Roma does not take into account the inconsistencies in a system where a continuing economic 
need for cheap labor coupled with persistent corruption and restrictive legal migration policies combine to 
encourage irregular migration.  Rather than expulsion, the needs of an economic system would rather suggest 
a regularization of their status and of their access to labor markets (Bleahu, 2007) 
14 For a previous exchange on the relevance of ethnographic and “rational” approaches in the field of ethnic 
conflict, see Laitin (2006) and Varshney (2006).   
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allow more general conclusions to be drawn because of the number and composition of 
case studies.  But there is no question that anthropological investigations of ethnicity and 
ethnic strife are less abstract and more context specific than those of economists. 
 
 Characterizing political science is difficult because it is in flux and is now quite 
heterogeneous as the result of the growing influence of economics oriented methodologies. 
Political science seems to occupy the middle level ground between the abstraction and 
aggregation of economics, and the context specificity and disaggregated perspective of 
anthropology.  This is partly because of the natural focus in political science on processes 
and outcomes at the level of the nation state—in this they come close to the focus of 
economists on the determinants of national level economic outcomes.  But, even despite the 
growing influence of deductive model building from economics, political science is 
unlikely to lose its attention to context specificity and feedback loops in assessing causal 
claims going from ethnic divisions to ethnic strife or other outcomes. 
 
 While a strength of the anthropological perspective is its focus and attention on 
complex local sites where ethnicity plays out, a related weakness may be a general 
difficulty in generalizing and comparing from specific sites.  Methodologies of political 
science or economics can act as a spur to anthropology to think beyond the somewhat 
closed box of “thick description” (Geertz, 1973).  Conversely, an anthropological 
perspective may act as a corrective to the “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller, 2002) of some social science. 
 
 The focus on processes of categorization of the approach outlined here is one way 
in which anthropological contributions may move beyond a tendency to overly privilege a 
somewhat cloistered ethnographic site.  The emphasis on the broad economic, social and 
political and cultural processes and relations at work at the local scale, and at work in 
delineating ethnic group boundaries, may  not only suggest that ethnic boundaries are in 
flux, but so too are the boundaries of the local.  Without a stable site of analysis, 
anthropology has the opportunity to move beyond thick and localized description towards a 
broader sense of how the local and its structures of identity are influenced by extra-local 
forces.  The anthropological contribution thus is to study ethnicity as means of highlighting 
broader economic, social and political issues and queries.  The anthropological optic is 
useful as a corrective to the methodological nationalism of the social sciences generally and 
as a way of understanding the complexities of the local as constituted by multi-scalar 
forces.  
 
 One of the great strengths of the anthropological work on ethnicity is that it is 
subject-driven.  Theory emerges from immersion in the field and the behavior of the 
subjects is probed through participant observation.  Standard survey research, used both by 
economists and political scientists, is rarely subject-driven.  Preexisting theory in a given 
subfield often determines the questions asked.  Surveys may cover a wider range of 
subjects, but that is typically at the cost of depth.  While it remains unclear what the 
appropriate mixture of breadth and depth in social science research is, the anthropological 
mode of inquiry remains uniquely suited to questions that require in-depth analysis. 
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From the perspective of economists and political scientists the strength of 
anthropological research lies in theory building, not theory testing.  Anthropologists’ in-
depth focus on a case, or a few cases, is a legitimate way to build theories, but that is not an 
accepted mode of theory testing in economics, and increasingly in political science, unless 
the theory to be tested is deterministic and does not allow any exceptions.  Testing 
probabilistic theories, which most social science theories tend to be, requires a large sample 
(or a large-n).  That is what econometrics as a mode of theory testing does.   
 
The anthropologist Andre Gingrich argues that anthropology is necessarily 
comparative in nature: it is never an isolated study of networks and relations in a particular 
society – it is never thus simply inductive - but involves comparison, even if only with the 
anthropologist’s own networks and relations.  Gingrich argues that fundamental questions 
of anthropology – what do humans have in common and how do they differ? – require, 
today, a macro-anthropological approach because connections of a globalized world call 
for far-ranging comparative study (Gingrich, 2002).  The testing of macro-anthropological 
theory involves a study of how broad global connections play out differently in different 
spaces.  The macro-anthropological approach does not do away with micro-anthropological 
studies of specific areas but extends micro-anthropological study where questions about 
human conditions in specific spaces are connected to broader networks.  Cases are 
extended, what they denote and where geographically they are located are points of 
contention.  At the same time, macro-anthropology requires input from micro-anthropology 
for the testing and expansion of its theory (Tsing, 2004). 
 
Of course, theory building does not have to be case based, or inductive.  It can also 
take a purely deductive form, as in a formal model.  Most economists build their theories 
mathematically, which are then tested econometrically (or experimentally).  In contrast, 
anthropologists build theories inductively ---- by empirically studying one case in depth, or 
a few well-chosen cases in substantial depth (thinning thereby description of each case in 
search of generalization).  Political science stands somewhere in the middle.  Some 
political scientists work the way the economists do – building theories formally and testing 
them with a large number of observations.  For theory testing, political scientists are 
increasingly relying on econometrics or experimental methods. 
 
 No single discipline, we believe, has the monopoly of excellence in analyzing 
ethnicity and ethnic strife.  Each discipline has its strengths, and its weaknesses. Indeed, 
quite often the weakness is simply the other side of the coin from strength.  In other words, 
we should be looking for complementarities between disciplines and deploy them all to 
understand a vitally important phenomenon. 
 
 How can interdisciplinarity in the analysis of ethnicity and ethnic strife be 
advanced? Several strands of actions suggest themselves.  First, there should be more 
venues where different disciplinary papers are presented and discussed, so that each group 
becomes familiar with, if not necessarily expert in, the languages of the other groups, as 
well as with the epistemology that underpins each discipline.  But we need to go beyond 
this general familiarization.  Second, we would suggest that interdisciplinary teams should 
tackle the explanation of, say, a particular episode of ethnic violence to see if they can 
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arrive at a common understanding.  Third, another task for interdisciplinary teams could be 
to focus on the question of what policies might help to mitigate ethnic tension and ethnic 
violence.  The problem is important enough to warrant resources to be devoted to it, and 
intellectually relevant, puzzling and demanding enough to warrant the excitement and the 
commitment of scholars from across the social sciences. 
 
 
7. Outline of Symposium  
 
This Symposium brings together a selection of peer reviewed papers, by leading 
established scholars and young researchers, on ethnicity and ethnic strife.15
 In their paper, “Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War,” political scientists 
James Fearon and David Laitin start with the observation that ethnic civil wars are 
heterogenous, but that in 31% of the cases in their data set “the spark for the war is 
violence between members of a regional ethnic group that considers itself to be the 
indigenous “sons-of-the-soil” and recent migrants from other parts of the country.”  Their 
  The papers 
between them cover the issues raised in this overview, and highlight the complementary 
strengths of different approaches. 
 
  “Inequalities Between Groups: Theory and Empirics” by Arjun Jayadev and Sanjay 
Reddy is part of a vibrant economic literature devoted to expanding and extending the 
measurement of group based diversity beyond the simple ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
measure discussed in earlier sections.  Among other dimensions, they incorporate the 
extent to which differences in average group incomes (for example) account for overall 
income inequality.  The proposed measures are illustrated with data for five societies.  The 
next paper, “Revisiting Between-Group Inequality Measurement:  An Application to the 
Dynamics of Caste Inequality in Two Indian Villages”, by Peter Lanjouw and Vijayendra 
Rao, is also in the same spirit. It proposes a modification of inequality-decomposition 
based measures of group inequality, and applies it to the case of caste in India.  Both of 
these papers, and this strand of the economic literature generally, try to integrate different 
conceptualizations of the salience of ethnicity into the measurement of ethnic diversity. 
 
 The next three papers all focus on the most extreme consequence of ethnic 
tension—civil war.  We have discussed the aggregative economic literature on ethnic 
diversity and its consequences for economic growth and for civil war.  We have also 
discussed critiques of this literature, from within the econometric fold and without.  The 
paper by Graham Brown and Arnim Langer, “Riding the Ever Rolling Stream:  Time and 
the Ontology of Violent Conflict” is a critique from within the econometric frame, and it 
focuses in particular on the treatment of time in the regression analysis that is at the 
foundation of the literature.  Their overall conclusion, that “we must be much more careful 
in deriving universalist conclusions about the ‘causes’ of conflict from econometric 
studies” is one that makes a case for combining econometric studies with  careful case 
studies of the type that conducted by the next two papers in the Symposium. 
 
                                                 
15 The papers were selected after peer review from among the papers presented at conference on Ethnicity and 
Ethnic Strife, held at the Central European University in September 25-27, 2008. 
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analysis and argument, which includes a case study of Sri Lanka, highlights the 
conditioning variables that turn diversity into tension and tension into violence. Fearon and 
Laitin emphasize policies and state intervention, as well as the basic structural features of 
migration into indigenous land, as determinants of outbreak of insurgency and civil war.  
 
 Paul Richards brings the perspective of anthropology in his paper, “Tracing Causal 
Processes in Two West African Villages:  A Systematic Approach to the Cultural 
Explanations of War.” But he also addresses fellow anthropologists, challenging what he 
calls (following Mary Douglas), “bongo-bongoism”, and “subjective regression” meaning 
by this the stringing together of  “an attractive necklace of an argument, pleasing to the 
owner but of no objective robustness.” Of course “regression” here means something 
different from the “regression” of econometrics (or perhaps not!).  Richards’s challenge 
relates directly to the “thick description”/ “thin description” divide we discussed earlier in 
this paper, and he advances the exercise of “causal process tracing” as an antidote to overly 
thick description that then stops there. The specific cases he considers, of insurgencies in 
West Africa, are illustrations of the method.  We have here, therefore, an anthropologist 
reaching for generalization from case studies, towards the econometricians Brown and 
Langer reaching for more specificity from cross-national correlations. 
 
 Below the scale of all out ethnic civil war is the violent conflict that is seen in 
ethnic riots. Two papers in the Symposium focus on this phenomenon. The detailed 
analysis confirms again the importance of contingent factors in converting diversity and 
tension into conflict. In his paper, “The Spatial Distribution of Riots:  Patronage and the 
Instigation of Communal Violence in Gujarat, India”, Ward Berenschott looks at two 
localities in Ahmedabad during the horrific riots of 2002. One of these communities 
remained by and large peaceful despite the mayhem surrounding it, while the other 
succumbed to Hindu-Muslim violence.  What explains the difference, according to 
Berenschott, is the presence in the latter case of “political patronage networks that derive 
electoral gains from political violence.”  Of course this in turn raises the question of why 
one community has such networks and the other does not, but the general point about the 
lessons to be learnt from disaggregating and comparing across localities is well made.  
 
Samsul Rizal Panggabean and Benjamin Smith, in their paper, “Explaining Anti-
Chinese Riots in Late 20th Century Indonesia” find a similar phenomenon to be 
explained—namely the absence of riots in some places and at certain times, but not in 
others.  Applying process tracing to paired city comparisons of Medan-Solo, which 
experienced violence in May 1998, and Surabaya-Yogyakarta, which experienced none, 
they argue that where the security forces could not control anti-state student 
demonstrations, they provoked “anti-Chinese violence to distract from a) their inabilities to 
control protests and b) their own targeting in protesters’ rhetoric.”  Panggabean and Smith 
use the term “frame shifting strategy” to describe this phenomenon, and show how a 
seemingly unrelated event (protests against the government by students) can be channeled 
into ethnic conflict by political actors and entrepreneurs. 
 
 Since a significant amount of ethnic violence is perpetrated against and by Islamic 
groups, the issue of Islamic identity and its interactions with surrounding politics and 
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culture are a prominent feature of the literature on ethnicity and ethnic strife.  The next two 
papers in the Symposium take up this issue.  Jean-Philippe Platteau’s paper, “Political 
Instrumentalization of Islam and the Risk of Obscurantist Deadlock” deals with the 
question of whether there is something inherent in Islam that is incompatible with 
democracy, as suggested by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington.  Platteau argues the 
contrary, starting from “a systematic misconception about the true nature of the relationship 
between Islam and politics: far from being fused into the religious realm, politics tends to 
dominate religion.”  With this background, and given the decentralized nature of religious 
authority in Islam, Platteau concludes that the greater risk is one of “obscurantist deadlock” 
where political competition uses religion in increasingly vicious ways. 
 
 A different perspective on Islam, and indeed on religion, is provided by Patrick 
Eisenlohr in “Religious Media, Devotional Islam, and the Morality of Ethnic Pluralism in 
Mauritius.”  We have discussed ethnic markers, and religion as one such marker, earlier in 
this paper.  The focus there was on “boundary maintenance.”  But Eisenlohr argues that this 
misses the moral dimensions of religious teaching, and the effect that this can have on 
inter-ethnic relations—helping co-existence rather than hindering it.  He argues that this is 
the case in Mauritius, where religion is very much in the public sphere, and religious 
traditions contribute to the successful ethnic pluralism that is the hallmark of that polity. 
 
 The final two papers continue the theme of interactions at the boundary, and the 
management of collective action in the presence of ethnic divisions.  Daniel Monterescu, in 
his paper, “Estranged Natives and Indigenized Migrants:  An Anthropological Perspective 
on Ethnically Mixed Towns in Israel”, argues that contrary to an “ethnocracy” perspective 
of spatial segregation, “it is precisely the indeterminate “contact zone” between and betwixt 
communities and spaces that constitutes the political and cultural realities in the city.” 
Monterescu in effect offers a counter to “methodological nationalism,” which was 
considered as a key feature of social scientific study of ethnicity in an earlier section in this 
overview. It allows us to see the mechanism of “productive negotiation of cultural 
identities and social worlds,” which the aggregative perspective of economics or even 
political science might miss. 
 
 The last paper in the Symposium is at the other end of the spectrum from ethnic 
strife and violence. It considers a case where there has been progress and social 
development despite high fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.  In essence the 
paper offers yet another challenge to studies based on “the size and distribution of ethnic 
groups as a proxy for the nature of ethnic relations.”  In her case study of the Indian state of 
Kerala, “We-ness and Welfare:  A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, 
India,” Singh argues that “cohesiveness of the political community, a subjective feeling of 
belonging to a common polity,” can transcend demographics of ethnic fragmentation.  This 
of course raises the question what in turn gives rise to these subjective feelings of 
integration, and how these cases differ from cases where ethnic divisions do indeed 
translate into ethnic tension and then into ethnic violence. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Until the early 1980s, very few scholars were interested in ethnicity.  Indeed, if one 
were to hazard a guess, only the discipline of anthropology was paying sustained 
intellectual attention to ethnic groups.  By the late 1980s, the number of political scientists 
studying ethnicity began to increase substantially.  And by the late 1990s, economists also 
started paying attention.    
 
Both political science and economics came to ethnicity indirectly.  The study of 
conflict has traditionally been a major domain of inquiry within political science.  By the 
1980s, so much of the conflict raging in the world appeared to be framed in ethnic terms 
that the conceptual category of ethnicity had to be taken seriously, if not accepted 
uncritically.   And for many development economists, the economic decline of Sub-
Saharan Africa by the 1990s was a matter of grave concern.  Could African economic 
stagnation, they asked, have something to do with Africa’s ethnic divides?  Ethnicity 
became relevant to political science and economics because some of the great substantive 
questions of the disciplines spurred an intellectual move in that direction. 
 
 By now the number of scholars studying ethnicity and ethnic strife is truly large.  
What is surprising, however, is how little systematic communication, let alone interaction, 
there is between researchers across these disciplines.  Part of the reason, of course, has to 
do with the disciplinary languages and boundaries that make interdisciplinary 
communication difficult.  But part of the reason is also quite simply the lack of venues for 
interaction between researchers from different disciplines.  The scholarship is located in 
various academic disciplines, but there is virtually no interdisciplinary site where insights, 
methods and conclusions are jointly shared or collectively interrogated.  Collaborative 
research endeavors are also quite rare.  Will interdisciplinarity bring greater intellectual 
rewards?  We have argued in this paper that each discipline has complementary strengths 
(not to mention weaknesses) and, given the nature of the problem at hand, the case for 
interdisciplinarity is strong indeed. 
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